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1. Plenary is defined as "full, entire, complete, absolute, perfect, unqualified."
Black's Law Dictionary 1038 (5th ed. 1979). See also infra note 24, discussion of the
scope of the plenary powers of the PSC as recently announced by the Louisiana Supreme
Court.
2. "Cole, J., concurs additionally to note the absurdity of the Commission's plenary
authority argument, the continued pursuit of which exhibits constitutional illusions of
being a fourth branch of government." Herman Bros., Inc. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 564 So. 2d 294, 298 (La. 1990) ( Cole, J., concurring).
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INTRODUCTORY HYPOmTiIcALs
"Agency" is created by the 1974 state constitution. It is given
"plenary power"' to regulate and to make reasonable rules, regulations
and procedures. 4 The powers are generally regarded as quasi-legislative,
quasi-judicial, and quasi-executive in nature.
Hypothetical One:5
A statute requires the payment of attorney's fees arising out of an
intervention in an Agency hearing. Upon application by the intervenor
for attorney's fees, Agency refuses on the grounds that the statute is
an unconstitutional infringement upon Agency's constitutional rule-mak-
ing power.
3. For example, the 1974 Constitution provides:
The [Public Service] Commission shall regulate all common carriers and public
utilities and have such other regulatory authority as provided by law. It shall
adopt and enforce reasonable rules, regulations, and procedures necessary for
the discharge of its duties, and shall have other powers and perform other duties
as provided by law.
La. Const. art. IV, § 21(B).
4. E.g., Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n-La. Const. art. IV, § 21 and Civil Serv.
Comm'n-La. Const. art. X, § 10.
5. Based upon the facts of In re Brisset, 424 So. 2d 1040 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982),
rev'd, 430 So. 2d 79, on remand, 436 So. 2d 654 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 441




Sole proprietor S applies to Agency for a certificate. The certificate
issues. X, 'a previously absent6 child now claims an interest in the
certificate. X alleges that the sole proprietorship was a community
enterprise7 of S's marriage with H and, thus, is partially his by inher-
itance.' Agency declares that article 59 conflicts with Agency's order,
noting that its powers under the constitution9 are plenary.
Hypothetical Three: 10
Corporation A is the holder of a certificate for hauling household
goods and cement. Sixteen days after B obtains a certificate to haul
household goods, A and B make a joint application for a swap of
certificates.
A pre-1974 statute" provides that no certificate shall be transferred
unless the owner has substantially operated all rights under its certificate
for six months. Agency grants the certificate swap. Upon appeal of the
Order by an aggrieved intervenor,12 Agency responds that legislation
cannot permissibly conflict with Agency rules, regulations, or orders
adopted pursuant to Agency's constitutional powers. 3
In each hypothetical the aggrieved party filed suit against Agency
and each of its officers in their personal capacity under 42 U.S.C.
section 198314 for $10,000,000.00 and attorney's fees. 5
I. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES-STATUTORY CONFLICTS
A. The Problem
These hypotheticals suggest some of the scenarios in which a con-
stitutional agency may be faced with a conflict between one of its duly
6. La. Civ. Code art. 47, as amended by 1990 La. Acts Ifo. 989, § 1, states: "An
absent person is one who has no representative in this state and whose whereabouts are
not known and cannot be ascertained by diligent efforts."
La. Civ. Code art. 54, as amended by 1990 La. Acts No. 989, § 1, states: "One who
has been an absent person for five years is presumed to be dead."
La. Civ. Code art. 59, as amended by 1990 La. Acts No. 989, § 1, states: "If the
person who is presumed to be dead ... reappears, he shall be entitled to recover his
inheritance in the condition in which it is found from those who succeeded in his default."
7. La. Civ. Code art. 2350.
8. La. Civ. Code art. 888.
9. La. Const. art. IV, § 21.
10. Based upon the facts of Herman Bros., Inc. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
564 So. 2d 294 (La. 1990).
11. La. R.S. 45:166 (1982).
12. La. Const. art. IV, § 21(E).
13. Adapted from Defendants-Appellees Original Brief, at 8, Herman Brothers, Inc.,
564 So. 2d 294.
14. See infra note 146 for the text of the statute.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1980).
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enacted rules, regulations, or procedures and a statute. The problem is
complicated by the possibility that the conflicting statute may have been
enacted prior to the agency's grant of authority. Furthermore, the specter
of a potential suit based upon 42 U.S.C. section 1983 ("1983") looms
if the agency makes the wrong decision. Usually a 1983 suit will be
brought against the agency officials in their personal capacity for mon-
etary damages, and against the agency officials in their official capacity
for injunctive relief.
The underlying issue of the agency's dilemma arises out of the
tension inherent in the creation of a quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative, and
quasi-executive agency in a state constitution in which there is also the
traditional expression of a strict separation of powers. 6 This ambiguous
constitutional structure raises the essential question of the role, if any,
for the constitutionally created administrative agency in determining the
constitutionality of statutes. If such agencies are not to have a role,
then what is the agency's proper response when faced with a statute
that the Agency would otherwise deem unconstitutional because the
statute encroaches upon the agency's plenary constitutional grant of
authority? However, even this "turf battle" may pale in significance
when compared to the potent threat of a 1983 action if the agency acts
under an unconstitutional statute. 7
The issues involved here also raise the general policy question of
whether increased judicial efficiency obtained by allowing the agency to
adjudicate all issues might provide sufficient reason to challenge tra-
ditional notions of separation of powers. State courts are faced with
the question of how to harmoniously construe constitutional provisions
that are statutory in nature, but placed in the state's basic document
for political reasons. Could the electors have created "a fourth branch
of government"? The answer is clearly that they could. But the questions
under the 1974 Constitution of Louisiana are did they, and, implicitly,
if they did, will the Louisiana Supreme Court recognize it?
This paper examines how courts in Louisiana have responded to
these types of issues when they have arisen in cases involving the Public
Service Commission ("PSC") and the Civil Service Commission ("CSC").
Additionally, the paper examines court decisions rendered in other ju-
16. See generally W. Hargrave, The Louisiana State Constitution 43-44 (1991); John-
son, Developments in the Law, 1983-84, Legislation-Procedure and Interpretation, 45
La. L. Rev. 341, 344-53 (1984). Professor Johnson discussed in great detail the conflicts
inherent in delegation of legislative powers to statutorily created agencies, but had no
occasion to explore the implications of constitutional agencies.




risdictions in similar cases and discusses related cases involving federal
constitutional questions."s A brief examination will be given to 1983
actions and their relationship to decisions by state agency officers. The
paper concludes with some thoughts as to why the power to declare a
statute unconstitutional 9 may of necessity inhere in Louisiana's consti-
tutionally-created agencies.
B. The Trend
While an explosion of constitutional agencies is unlikely,2° the same
may not be true of statutory agencies. Nonetheless, as the number of
administrative agencies increases there is a concomitant increase in the
number of occasions in which an agency will perform its adjudicative
role. Whether the subject matter is one of public or private rights,2'
each adjudicative exercise places the interest of a person at risk if the
agency is required to apply a statute that is unconstitutional. Thus,
agency action will often involve those cases that most clearly have a
need for true justice that can be obtained best by exercise of the full
power of the law by the agency.
It would serve both the interests of justice and governmental effi-
ciency to firmly and definitively establish the scope of the quasi-judicial
powers of agencies, both constitutional and statutory created. Failure
to clarify this scope will perpetuate expensive and dilatory litigation in
which the real parties in interest suffer real economic losses while agencies
and the Louisiana courts skirmish on a constantly shifting legal border.
II. AvornNo THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE: A PSC EXAMPLE
Certainly one easy way to "handle" the issue if it arises is to find
a non-constitutional ground upon which to determine the case on appeal.
This is easier when the agency simply ignores the "controlling" statute
in making its decision.
18. It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss non-constitutional based
administrative agencies. Since this is the only type of agency which exists in the federal
system, the cases are discussed for purposes of examining certain policies and rationales
for purposes of comparison and contrast.
19. "Mhe common phrase 'declared unconstitutional' is not correctly used in this
context, for there is no declaration. A court or an administrative agency may refuse to
apply a statute in a case before it because it conflicts with the constitution, but that
refusal does not suspend operation of the law, repeal it, or erase it from the books."
Hargrave, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983, Louisiana Constitutional Law, 44 La. L.
Rev. 423, 425 (1983).
20. See infra note 128 for a list of current constitutional agencies.




In Herman Brothers Inc. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission,2
the PSC reluctantly2 argued in brief, as an alternative ground for
affirming a PSC certificate swap decision, that its order was an exercise
of plenary poweru in regulating a common carrier. The PSC then
reasoned that if the pre-1974 statute in question25 could not be construed
to be in harmony with their order, then the order, being more recent
"legislation" 26 by the constitutional entity having plenary regulatory and
rule making ("legislative") power in this area of the law, must prevail
over the conflicting statute.2 7
B. The PSC's Powers-Comparing 1921 and 1974 Constitutional
Language
Article IV, § 21(B) POWERS AND DUTIES. The Commission
shall regulate all common carriers and public utilities and have
such other regulatory authority as provided by law. It shall
adopt and enforce reasonable rules, regulations, and procedures
necessary for the discharge of its duties, and shall have other
powers and perform other duties as provided by law. 2
The constitutional language clearly indicates that the PSC has reg-
ulatory powers over common carriers and public utilities, as well as
22. 564 So. 2d 294 (La. 1990).
23. "Although we have repeatedly contended that it is not necessary for a resolution
of this case to address the constitutional issue, if it is essential to a decision ...."
Defendants-Appellees Supplemental Brief, at 1, Herman Bros., Inc. v. Louisiana Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 564 So. 2d 294 (La. 1990).
24. In Louisiana Consumers' League, Inc. v. La. Public Serv. Comm'n, 351 So. 2d
128 (La. 1977), a two justice plurality supreme court decided that a PSC rule was invalid
because notice to the public prior to its effective date was insufficient. However, it also
held that the PSC's rule making powers were not subject to the La. Administrative
Procedures Act ("APA"), La. R.S. 49:951-970 (1987), because the constitutional grant
of rule making power to the PSC precluded the legislature from impinging on this power
through legislation. However, only two justices subscribed to the plurality's reasoning.
In concurring in the result that the rule was invalid, Justices Tate and Calogero expressed
the opinion the APA applied. Justice Dennis argued that due process, La. Const. art. I,
§ 23, and the requirement that the PSC adopt "reasonable" rules supported the result.
.Justices Summers and Dixon dissented.
Given the results in Consumers' League and the changes in the court personnel since
the decision, the PSC may wish to avoid the reconsideration of the question of the
applicability of the APA to its rule-making powers. It seems likely that were the court
to squarely face this question again, the PSC may find the APA imposed upon it.
25. La. R.S. 45:166 (1982).
26. La. Civ. Code art. 2 ("Legislation is the solemn expression of legislative will.").
27. La. Civ. Code art. 8.
28. La. Const. art. IV, § 21(B).
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rule-making powers, of a constitutional dimension. The phrase "as pro-
vided by law" qualifies only the language providing "other regulatory"
and "other duties" that may fall within the PSC's power ambit and
was one of the few purposeful changes made in this article at the 1973
Convention. 9
In fact, the comments of Delegate Perkins indicated that the new
provision was "basically .. . the same provision contained in the 1921
Constitution, but is put in far more general terms." ' 30 If this comment
truly reflects the intentions of the framers, it is important because the
1921 Constitution language describing the powers of the Commission
stated in part that "[tihe power of the Commission shall affect and
include all matters and things connected with ... supervision, regulation
and control." '3'
The word "matters" is the same word that was carried forward
from the 1921 Constitution into the grant of jurisdiction of district
courts in the 1974 Constitution. 32 To conclude that the use of the word
"matters" in describing jurisdiction of an article V court is intended
to convey the same meaning in describing the "quasi-judicial" jurisdic-
tion of the article IV PSC may be speculative. However, there is no
denying that each, the article V district court and the article IV PSC,
when acting within their respective "judicial sphere" has a comparable
range of problems ("matters") and tools (rules, statutes, orders, etc.).
Does this "in pari materia" construction necessarily compel the con-
clusion that the PSC has all article V court powers when acting as a
court within the PSC's jurisdiction. Obviously, the answer is no. Could
the constitutional provision be read to indicate this result? Obviously,
the answer is yes.
One of the few indications since the 1974 Constitution that could
give some indication of the meaning of the constitutional language is
the fate of pre-1974 statutes that regulate the PSC's "quasi-judicial
functions. 3 3 Even after the 1974 Constitution was ratified, statutory
29. 9 Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Tran-
scripts 2983, 104th Days Proceedings-December 19, 1973 ("Convention Transcripts").
The words "and ... as provided as law" were finally adopted in order to assure that
the PSC had some absolute constitutional power. The original language of the section
stated that the "commission shall regulate all common carriers and public utilities as
provided by law."
30. Comments of Delegate Lynn Perkins, Convention Transcripts, supra note 29, at
2984.
31. La. Const. art. VI, § 4 (1921) (emphasis added).
32. La. Const. art. V, § 16(A).
33. La. Const. art. X, § 12. Additionally, the CSC is given constitutional rights to
issue subpoenas and to administer the Oath in those cases. The PSC has similar powers
by virtue of statutes that generally preceded the 1974 Constitution. La. R.S. 45:1184
(1982) (Summons Powers Over Witnesses), La. R.S. 45:1186 (1982) (Contempt Powers).
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provisions continue to exist giving the PSC the power to hear complaints
for violations of its orders, rules, and regulations. The complaint may
be filed by "any person." 3 4 The PSC may make an award of damages
to the complainant and order it paid "on or before a named day.""5
The lack of statutory changes, repeals, or adverse court ruling as to
the statutes' validity when considered in light of the language describing
the powers of the PSC suggests that Delegate Perkins' opinion was
probably accurate.
Since Louisiana courts had little opportunity to construe the relevant
language of the 1921 Constitution in any manner that sheds light on
the issues raised in this paper, the most that one might argue from this
brief constitutional exegesis is that whatever the words meant in the
1921 constitution, they probably still mean the same thing in the 1974
constitution.
C. The Resolution of the Case
The Louisiana Supreme Court chose to decide the case upon a
statutory basis, finding that the PSC did not follow the clear words of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 45:166.36 The PSC argued that the purpose
of the statute was to prevent or suppress traffic in dormant or abandoned
certificates.3 7 The court found that even if preventing or suppressing
traffic in dormant certificates were the purpose of the statute, "the
statutory language does not except new certificates from the requirement
of six months' operation."3 Additionally, the court opined that to issue
the certificate upon a showing of "[plublic convenience and necessity" 39
34. La. R.S. 45:1196 (1982).
35. La. R.S. 45:1197 (1982).
36. The PSC argued the constitutional issue as an alternative argument and did not
press the argument at oral argument before the supreme court. When asked by Justice
Watson about the constitutional argument, the PSC stated that it did not wish to press
the claim unless the court would find that the PSC violated the statute.
In its application for rehearing the PSC specifically raised a challenge to the court's
activation "of a serious constitutional issue" when the court stated:
The legislature's lack of power to alter the commission's constitutional juris-
diction does not prevent the legislature from enacting substantive provisions
affecting motor carriers.
Herman Bros., Inc. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 564 So. 2d 294, 297 (La. 1990).
Given that the court disposed of the case without reaching the constitutional issue, it
was no surprise that the court denied the rehearing on this issue.
37. Id. at 296.
38. Id.
39. La. R.S. 45:164 (1982) provides in part:
[A] certificate of public convenience and necessity, which shall issue only after
... a finding of public convenience and necessity ....
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and then allow the successful applicant to immediately transfer the same
certificate would be "anomalous.' '4
The court reversed and remanded to the PSC. Thus, the PSC and
the court receded from the constitutional question, leaving it for another
day. 4' What is not clear from this encounter is the rationale or the
policy choices underlying the court's decision.
If the court implicitly stated that the statute is valid, then the court
has implicitly stated that at least one of the statutes that came into
existence after the "constitutional" PSC42 is a valid exercise of legislative
power in matters arguably committed to the PSC. This suggested analysis
immediately calls into question the scope of the powers granted to the
PSC in article IV, section 21(B) of the 1974 Constitution which provides
in part:
It shall adopt and enforce reasonable rules, regulations, and
procedures necessary for the discharge of its duties .... 41
The court could construe this granting language literally and provide
the basis for the conclusion that the legislature can freely legislate
substantively in matters related to the function of the PSC. But this
construction would apply only as long as it does not attempt to reduce
the PSC's jurisdiction over common carriers or public utilities or attempt
to create rules, regulations, or procedures necessary for the PSC to
discharge its duties. The often fine line between substantive rules, which
apparently the legislature can impose on the PSC, and procedural rules,
which appear to be the constitutional grist of the PSC, is evidenced by
Herman Brothers.
The six month use requirement is a substantive expression of leg-
islative intent, although the PSC and the court may disagree as to what
that intent may be. However, the statute additionally addresses matters
that are arguably procedural. Did the court decide that on balance the
substantive portion was predominant? Was the court swayed by the lack
of any "rule, precept or principle of law" that might conflict with the
statute?" If the latter, is mere conflict sufficient or is that only the
first step of an analysis yet to be developed? This resolution of Herman
Brothers leaves open the difficult question that will arise when the PSC
40. Herman Bros., 564 So. 2d at 296.
41. Justice Cole's concurrence, however, indicates that at least one court member has
little patience for the constitutional authority argument. Id. at 298. See also supra note
2.
42. See text accompanying infra notes 64-67.
43. La. Const. art. IV, § 21(B) (emphasis added).
44. Herman Bros., 564 So. 2d at 298 (Dennis, J., concurring). The only indication
of a possible line of demarcation between the legislature's powers and the PSC's power
is the result in Louisiana Consumers' League discussed in supra note 24.
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issues an order or enacts a rule, regulation or procedure that directly
conflicts with an existing statute, basing its action solely upon its con-
stitutional plenary power to do so.
However, in Herman Brothers even if the court would have con-
cluded that the statute was invalid because of the PSC's plenary powers
in such matters, the court could still justify the results in the case. The
PSC's indifference to the clear words of the statute was not based upon
any notion of constitutional supremacy of its own actions over the
statute.
45
Since the PSC made no effort to follow the statute or to declare
the statute in conflict with the PSC's power, there was really no question
properly before the court on the issue. In fact, the PSC implored the
court to avoid wasting the parties' time and effort that would result by
remanding to the PSC since six months had passed. Thus, the PSC
tacitly affirmed the PSC's belief in the statute's validity. As Justice
Lemmon indicated in his dissent, this efficiency argument has some
attraction. 46 In the end, however, this case would have been a weak
factual case upon which to base a definitive statement of the agency-
legislative-judicial power demarcation.
An earlier case involving the CSC brought the issue squarely before
a reviewing court. An examination of the results in that case may shed
some light on the PSC's chances of pressing their constitutional claim
successfully in the "right" case.
III. THE UNAVOIDABLE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE: A CSC EXAMPLE
A. The Federal Harbinger
In the federal district court case, Jackson v. Dept. of Public Safety,
a section 1983 case, the trial court stated that:
The Civil Service Commission, however, could not rule on the
constitutionality of the statutes, although it could interpret the
statutes at issue (La. Const. of 1974, Article 5, Section 1). (But
the constitutionality could be addressed on appeal from the Civil
Service ruling which is appealed directly to the Court of Appeal).
And, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a prerequisite
to a civil rights suit under § 1983. 47
45. As has been discussed above in supra text accompanying notes 36-43, the PSC's
constitutional argument was advanced with only the greatest reluctance as a secondary
argument to its statutory justification.
46. Herman Bros., 564 So. 2d at 298 (Lemmon, J., dissenting).
47. Jackson v. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 562 F. Supp. 324, 326-27 (M.D. La. 1983),
appeal dism'd, 755 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).
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B. The State Court Opinion
Within a few months of Jackson a state case, In re Brisset," arose.
In Brisset, the CSC refused to apply a statute requiring the CSC to
pay attorney's fees in certain appeals49 before the CSC. The CSC opined
that the statute was unconstitutional because it attempted to usurp powers
granted exclusively to the CSC by the Louisiana Constitution. 0
On appeal the first circuit determined that the CSC had no power
to determine the constitutionality of state statutes, 51 and vacated the
CSC's decision to that extent. 2 The court of appeal "reinstated" the
statute without deciding its constitutionality. The Louisiana Supreme
Court 3 granted writs, and, then, reversed and remanded to the first
circuit for a decision on the constitutionality of the statute. On remand,
the first circuit stated:
At the outset, this court reaffirms its previous holding in this
case with respect to the commission's lack of power to rule on
the constitutionality of a state statute. See also La. Constitution
1974, Art. V, Sec. 1.
After the first circuit concluded that the CSC has no such power,
the court then found the statute to be a violation of the CSC's con-
stitutional powers.55 The court's "argument" is clear. By invoking, as
48. In re Brisset, 424 So. 2d 1040 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982), rev'd, 430 So. 2d 79,
on remand, 436 So. 2d 654 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 441 So. 2d 749 (1983).
49. La. Const. art. X, § 8. Right of appeal in disciplinary matters or claims of
discrimination.
50. La. Const. art. X, § 10.
51. Judge Ponder noted in his concurrence that:
I do express some doubt as to the propriety of the holding that the Civil Service
Commission cannot declare an act on the subject of their procedure unconsti-
tutional, especially without expressing the thought that they can refuse to follow
an act they think to be unconstitutional.
In re Brisset, 436 So. 2d 654, 659 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983) (Ponder, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
52. La. Const. art. X, § 12.
53. In re Brisset, 430 So. 2d 79 (La. 1983).
54. In re Brisset, 436 So. 2d at 658. Professor Hargrave points out that Constant
only addressed the issue of "the extent to which the drafters of the constitution express
an intent that is controlling on the courts." Hargrave, supra note 19, at 426 n.18.
55.
[W]e now hold that the power vested in the commission under Art. X, Sec.
10(A) of the constitution is exclusive in nature with respect to all aspects to
the classified service listed therein. This includes appeals from disciplinary action
to the commission. a As such, L.S.A.-R.S. 42:1451 infringes on the exclusive
power granted to the commission by the Louisiana Constitution, Art. X, Sec.
10(A), Therefore, we hold this statute unconstitutional.
In re Brisset, 436 So. 2d at 658-59.
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did the court in Jackson,5 6 Art. V, section 1,S7 the clear inference is
that the court considers the power to make the determination of the
constitutionality of a statute to be the sole province of an article V
court.5"
The difficulty with this implied exclusive province argument is that
it is conclusory and does not attempt to address the reasons why the
courts are the only bodies that possess this power. 9
IV. TRADITIONAL OBJECTIONS
A. Separation of Powers 0 Under The Louisiana Constitution
1. Louisiana Constitutional Textual Developments
In each Louisiana constitution except the 1863 Constitution, the
fundamental tripartite structure of government has been explicitly defined
in the triad of legislative, executive and judiciary branches dividing
among themselves the powers of government. 61 In addition, this division
of power is followed by an expression of the traditional doctrine of
separation of powers. 62 Concurrent with this recognition of the basic
structure of our government is the recognition of the vesting of the
entire judiciary power in a supreme court and inferior courts. 63
56. See discussion of Jackson in text accompanying supra note 47.
57. "The judicial power is vested in a supreme court, courts of appeal, district courts
and other courts authorized by this article." La. Const. art. V, § 1.
58. There is some literal support in the constitution for this conclusion since the
Commission is not an "other court authorized by this Article." La. Const art. V, § 1.
The common understanding of this provision was that the legislature could not divest
the article V courts of their jurisdiction. Hargrave, The Judiciary Article of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974, 37 La. L. Rev. 766, 777 (1977).
59. See, generally, Hargrave, supra note 19, at 423-24.
60. One scholar has recently noted that "[w]hile the principle is still an important
one, Louisiana in modern times has swayed from a strict separation of powers." W.
Hargrave, supra note 16, at 44.
61. La. Const. art. I, § 1 (1812); tit. I, § 1 (1845); tit. I, § 1 (1852); tit. II, § 1
(1864); art. 14 (1879); art. 16 (1898); art. 16 (1913); art. II, § 1 (1921); art. II, § 1
(1974).
The adoption at the 1973 Convention was by a vote of 100-0 for art. II, § 1. W.
Hargrave, supra note 16, at 44.
62. La. Const. art. 1, § 2 (1812); tit. I, § 2 (1845); tit. I, § 2 (1852); tit. II, § 2
(1864); art. 15 (1879); art. 17 (1898); art. 17 (1913); art. II, § 2 (1921); art. II, § 2
(1974).
The adoption at the 1973 Convention was by a vote of 107-1 for art. II, § 2. W.
Hargrave, supra note 16, at 44.
63. La. Const. art. IV, § 1 (1812); tit. IV, § 62 (1845); tit. IV, § 61 (1852); tit V,




On the other hand, the PSC became a constitutional entity in the
1898 Constitution." In the 1921 Constitution, the PSC appeared in article
VI, "Administrative Officers and Boards.''65 The PSC is now consti-
tutionally based in article IV, section 21 of the 1974 Constitution. Article
IV is entitled "Executive Branch." Yet, with the "constitutionalizing"
of the PSC in 1898, the PSC's exclusive regulatory authority and rule-
making power6 were elevated to a nominal par with that of the tripartite
branches. Despite this textual opportunity for the type of issues suggested
in the hypotheticals to arise, the PSC has until recently steered a course
that avoided foundering on the rocks of constitutional adjudication. 67
2. Influence of Marbury v. Madison
The separation of powers question arises in the sense of whether
or not the constitutional agency may exercise the judicial power of
constitutional adjudication of statutes that are applicable to the agency
in its "quasi-judicial" role. In Marbury v. Madison,6 courts of the
United States, and later the states, found inherent in the grant of judicial
power, the power to pass on the constitutionality of laws.
However, as one author points out,69 the "inherentness" of this
power arises out of the courts' role in deciding cases and not out of
any special role that the courts have in deciding such a question. It
must also be recognized that the legislative and the executive branch
also have a part in determining whether or not a statute is unconsti-
tutional. The governor exercises this power by veto of acts of the
legislature on grounds of unconstitutionality. The legislature exercises
its power in the very act of creating legislation that it deems constitutional
by the act of passage.
64. La. Const. arts. 283-289 (1898), under the heading "Railroad, Express, Telephone,
Steamboat and Sleeping Car Company Commission."
65. La. Const. art. VI, §§ 3-9 (1921).
66. The PSC granting language has changed little in the successive constitutional
versions. See supra note 3.
67. In the 1954 Projet, the Louisiana Law Institute proposed art. IV, § 19 which
provided, in part, that " [t]he legislature shall prescribe the powers and duties of the
[PSC]." 2 Projet of a Constitution for the State of Louisiana with Notes and Studies
396 (1954).
Comment I noted that "[t]he Institute considered deleting completely the provision for
the [PSC], but because of its importance as a quasi-judicial and a quasi-legislative body
the basic provision was retained." 2 Projet of a Constitution for the State of Louisiana
with Notes and Studies 401 (1954) (emphasis added).
68. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); LeBreton v. Morgan, 4 Mart. (N.S.) 138 (La.
1826) (the judiciary possesses the power to declare laws contrary to the constitution void,
as a necessary power inherent in their office).
69. Hargrave, supra note 19.
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How then, is the Marbury rationale to apply to an agency created
by the constitution with powers that include judicial, legislative and
executive powers, albeit limited to a particular area of the expertise?
The bare assertion that the Marbury power is exclusive to courts ipso
facto would act to limit the agency when exercising its "judicial func-
tions" without discussion of the existence or propriety of such a power
in the agency.70 The text of the 1974 Constitution arguably supports an
interpretation in favor of rather than against the grant of a complete
"judicial power" for the agency within the limits of its power ambit.
3. An Implied Modification of Separation of Powers
A cursory examination of the 1974 Constitution shows that both
the PSC and the CSC are given certain similar constitutional powers to
act as a judicial body in determining certain matters. 7' Judicial review
is provided by 'appellate jurisdiction in the district court 72 and the court
of appeal7" respectively. 74 In either case, the appeal is based upon the
70. Id. at 424-25.
71. Public Serv. Comm'n-La. Const. art. IV, § 21(B)-see supra note 3. While this
language is not as clear as that relating to the CSC's power to decide cases, the language
of La. Const. art. IV, § 21(E) Appeals, makes its clear that the PSC is in fact deciding
a matter. CSC-La. Const. art. X, § 12(A)-"exclusive power and authority to hear and
decide all removal and disciplinary cases ... "
72. La. Const. art. IV, § 21(E). The venue for this suit is the district court in the
domicile of the PSC, today East Baton Rouge Parish.
73. La. Const. art. X, § 12(A).
74. Professor Hargrave draws some import from the distinction that PSC appeals
are to the district court, and CSC appeals are to the court of appeal. He argues that in
establishing the right of appeal in the court of appeal, and thus, bypassing the district
court, the constitution may have demonstrated a certain respect to the CSC's competence.
Hargrave, supra note 19, at 426 n.18.
This argument has some force if it is noted that the 1921 constitution granted the right
of appeal from the CSC directly to the supreme court on conclusions of law, but that
the CSC's conclusions of fact were final. La. Const. art. XIV, § 15(O)(1) (1921). Arguably
today this CSC deference would not be possible because of the 1974 provision granting
the courts the right of review of "both law and facts" in civil matters. La. Const. art.
V, § 5(C)-supreme court and § 10(B)-courts of appeal. See infra note 77.
If the 1974 Constitution provisions relating to appeals from the PSC are compared,
one can discern a certain respect for the PSC's decisions, also. The appeal is to the
district court, and, unlike appeals from the CSC, an express right of appeal to the supreme
court is granted. In addition, the statutes that govern the appeal in the district court
restrict the court to a review of the record instead of a de novo trial, comporting with
the district court's role as an appellate court. Thus, it would appear that the main
distinction between the two appeal routes is the difference between one judge and three
judges, and probably a result of historical accident rather than an expression of greater
confidence in one agency than the other.
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record developed in the agency hearing, not a trial de novo."s In ac-
cording finality of findings of fact7 6 to the agency record, the courts
are in fact giving greater deference to the agency than that which is
given to similar findings made by lower courts under Louisiana's system
of appellate review of fact. 77
The treatment of agency decisions in the appellate chain of review
also yields some other interesting observations. In the case of either
75. La. R.S. 45:1193 (1982) requires the PSC to file a certified copy of the transcript
of all proceedings before the PSC with the court in which the appeal is pending.
La. R.S. 45:1194 (1982) requires that if upon appeal the plaintiff "introduces evidence
which is found to be different from that offered ... before the [PSC], or additional
thereto, the court ... shall send a transcript of such evidence to the [PSC], and stay
proceedings .... [Tihe [PSC] shall consider the evidence ... and shall report its action
to the court ......
76. See supra text accompanying note 75.
77. The conclusion that the PSC's findings of fact are "final" is based upon the
mandatory remand requirement of La. R.S. 45:1194 (1982). Although the issue has not
been raised in any cases found by the writer, there is a distinctive difference between the
scope of appellate jurisdiction given to the Louisiana Courts of Appeal and the Louisiana
Supreme Court.
Art. V, § 5(C) provides, in part, that the scope of review of the supreme court "extends
to both law and facts, . . . [elxcept as otherwise provided by this constitution." Art. V,
§ 10(B) provides, in part, that the scope of review of the courts of appeal "extends to
law and facts, . . . [e]xcept ... as provided by law in review of administrative agency
determinations .... (emphasis added).
If these provisions are read literally, then the supreme court has power of review over
factual determinations over all agencies, regardless of any contrary statute. Conversely,
because of the wording of § 10(B), the courts of appeal may be subject to the demands
of statutes such as La. R.S. 45:1194 (1982). The appellate jurisdiction of the district
court, for purposes of the PSC, is controlled "as provided by law," under Art. V, §
16(B), and, thus, these courts would appear to be bound by La. R.S. 45:1982 (1982)
also.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has unrestricted review of law and fact. Art. V, § 5(D).
Is La. R.S. 45:1194 (1982) and other such statutes an unconstitutional infringement on
the supreme court's power of review of facts. To the extent that such statutes might be
read to preclude such review, the answer must be affirmative. To the extent that new
evidence might be raised in the supreme court, the statutory requisite of remand to the
agency would most likely be either utilized by the court, since its fact finding capabilities
are limited in practice, or the evidence would be rejected as an attempt to raise matters
not present in the record. Either choice avoids having to find the statute in conflict with
§ 5(D) and, thus, unconstitutional.
A final question that arises is whether or not the supreme court can reverse an agency
factual finding and render judgment adverse to the agency's determination. If an agency
decision involves a matter which is committed to the agency by the constitution, e.g.,
PSC's power to regulate common carriers, arguably the answer will be negative. To find
otherwise effectively strips the constitutional agency of its power to act in its area of
exclusive control. Conversely, if the decision is made on a subject over which the con-
stitutional agency is granted jurisdiction by statute, the supreme court's power to reverse
and render is most likely present.
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agency, the next level of appeal is the Louisiana Supreme Court. 7s This
latter observation also demonstrates that the constitutional agency is
treated as a lower court in a three-level court system. Thus, there is a
trial court, i.e., the agency, and a regular appellate route in the article
V courts. This structure of the agency chain of adjudication is com-
parable to the standard civil or criminal chain, i.e., trial court, court
of appeal and supreme court. In fact, one is hard pressed to see a
meaningful or logical distinction. If any meaningful distinctions exist
they revolve around the problems of the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Louisiana Supreme Court over the discipline of judges. 79
However, any such fine distinction must be tested against other
policy choices imbedded in the 1974 constitution. An objection to com-
plete agency judicial powers founded in lack of judicial expertise or
inability to apply the subtleties of constitutional analysis must address
the significance of the ratifiers' decision to retain certain historical courts
with full article V power despite the fact that the judges are not required
to be attorneys. The 1974 Constitution retained the mayor's courts and
justice of the peace courts as article V courts. 0 However, the 1974
Constitution does not require that the judges of these courts be admitted
to the practice of law. 8' The qualifications for these judgeships were
left up to the legislature. 2 Nonetheless, these judges exercise all article
V power when acting within the jurisdiction of their respective courts8 3
Is it logical to allow these minimal courts to have the potential to pass
on constitutionality of statutes while denying the same power to a
relatively significant and legally sophisticated entity such as the PSC or
CSC, solely on the basis of establishment by article V or lack thereof.
78. La. Const. art. IV, § 21(E) provides a right of direct appeal to the supreme
court "by any aggrieved party or intervenor."
La. Const. art. X, § 12(A) provides no right of appeal from the court of appeal to
the supreme court, but such a case should fall under the general supervisory jurisdiction
of the supreme court making an application for a writ of review possible. La. Const.
art. V, §§ 2, 5(A); La. Code Civ. P. art. 2193. In addition, the Louisiana Supreme Court
has appellate jurisdiction in "a case . .'. if (1) a law or ordinance has been declared
unconstitutional .... ." La. Const. art. V, § 5(D).
79. See discussion in infra text accompanying note 165.
80. La. Const. art. V, § 20.
81. Compare La. Const. art. V, § 24.
82. La. R.S. 13:2582(A) (Supp. 1990)-Justices of the Peace; Qualifications-"good
moral character, a qualified elector, and able to read and write the English language
correctly." La. R.S. 33:441(A)(B) (Supp. 1990)-Mayor's Court-"The mayor may try
all breaches .... the board of aldermen may, upon request of the mayor, appoint an
attorney ... as court magistrate."
83. Hargrave, supra note 58, at 812.
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4. If Agencies Share Some Article V Powers, How Much?
The more difficult question that would arise if the Louisiana Supreme
Court were willing to concede certain unenumerated "judicial powers"
to the agencies is: What are the constitutional and policy bases upon
which the court may make the distinction between those powers so
recognized and those that it is unwilling to recognize? The bright-line
rule of refusing to recognize any attempt by the agencies to breach the
separation-of-powers "wall" does have a strong element of certainty.
By strictly construing the agencies' grants of plenary authority, the court
retains the power to define "plenary." Expansion and contraction re-
mains within the power of the court to be exercised to achieve an
integration with contemporaneous political, social, and economic policies
as they change.
Any other decision will immediately immerse the court into the
never-ending quest of defining the powers implicit in the agency's con-
stitutional grant. A certain corollary will be that the agency or other
interested parties will be constantly probing the court's definition of this
limit. In the end, the court might choose to balance, sub rosa, the risk
of this "certain" increase in litigation in a relatively stable area of the
law, under the court's control, against the potential benefits of judicial
efficiency. There is no doubt that some efficiency inheres in allowing
the "trial court," especially one granted conclusive power of fact finding,
to consider constitutional issues that arise in the course of its regular
"judicial" function.
5. The Result of the Bright-Line Rule
The essential question is whether or not there is a judicial role for
the constitutionally created administrative agency in the determination
of a statute's constitutionality. If the agency has no judicial role, then
what is the agency's proper response when faced with an applicable
"conflicting" statute that the agency would deem unconstitutional be-
cause the statute encroaches on the agency's constitutional grant of
authority and raises the potent threat of a 1983 action if the agency
acts under an unconstitutional statute? The bright-line rule does not
seem to provide an adequate answer for this question unless the courts,
state and federal, are willing to grant the agency and its officers immunity
from such suit. Perhaps judicially developed immunities will provide an
uneasy compromise that will best suit the agencies' desires to have their
respective constitutional territories unimpaired by the supreme court while
allowing the supreme court to minimize the sharing of article V powers.
However, existence of immunities is usually a matter of defense and
not a bar to suit. Thus, the agency still faces costly litigation.
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B. Does Tradition Define Separation of Powers?
1. The Power of Tradition
In the recent United States Supreme Court case Burnham v. Superior
Court,4 Justice Scalia had the opportunity to discuss the traditional
expression of due process in the context of in personam jurisdiction.
Noting a continuing two-hundred year tradition of the unquestionable
right of a forum state to obtain jurisdiction over a person physically
present in the forum, he concluded that to do so cannot be so unfair
as to violate due process. He cautioned, however, that if enough ju-
risdictions abrogated this rule, then obtaining in personam jurisdiction
in this manner might at some point become a violation of due process.
By analogy, the doctrine of separation of powers has a long tradition
of keeping in place a constitutional wall between the traditional branches
of government. But in the two hundred years since the U.S. Constitution,
the advent and judicial recognition of the quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial,
quasi-executive agency has arguably modified the separation of powers
doctrine. A recognition of this modification could allow the courts to
recognize the power of such agencies while maintaining the integrity of
the doctrine of separation of powers in its traditional sense, i.e., as it
applies to the judicial, executive, and legislative branches.
2. Separation of Powers and Federal Administrative Agencies
Federal administrative agencies are not created in the federal con-
stitution. Rather, federal agencies such as the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, Federal Communications Commission, Food and Drug
Administration, and the many others have come by way of a torturous
road that has often required the Supreme Court to mark the boundary
of the separation of powers doctrine. 5 These agencies are fundamentally
different from Louisiana's constitutional agencies in the source of their
power. The former are creations of Congress by statutory law. As such
the question is usually whether or not Congress has impermissibly del-
egated legislative power to an executive agency, and thus, violated the
strict separation of powers doctrine. The latter are created by a delegation
of power by the ratifiers of the state constitution, concurrently with the
ratification of a nominal separation of powers article.
One authority suggests that the focus of the federal courts in this
area of dispute should be not be upon the specificity of the delegation
by Congress but rather upon an insistence that the delegation provide
84. Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2115-16 (1990).
85. See, generally, K. Davis, Administrative Law Text § 2.01, at 26-27 (3d ed. 1972).
[Vol. 51
ICOMMENTS
"protection against unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary power." 6
The proper question should be whether or not the standards promulgated
by Congress or the agency guarantee due process for all persons that
fall subject to the jurisdiction of the agency. s7 This suggestion is not
unlike a number of the concurring justices in Louisiana Consumers'
League,ss who suggested that Louisiana's Administrative Procedure Act
("APA") or state due process article are the proper guiding principles
over rule promulgation by the PSC.
Despite the similar functions of federal administrative agencies and
the Louisiana constitutional agencies, the critical distinction lies in the
fact that the PSC and CSC are constitutionally based. For this reason,
federal cases shed little, if any, light upon the question at hand.
3. Tradition Created By Constitutional Changes
The ratification of the 1921 and 1974 Constitutions in the same era
in which administrative agencies became constitutional creatures with
quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative, and quasi-executive powers arguably leads
to the conclusion that the article II, section 2 expression of separation
of powers has been impliedly modified to create a narrow exception for
the constitutionally mandated agencies.
Without this exception, the result is as that found in Herman Broth-
ers. The agency, unwilling or unable to rule on the constitutionality of
a conflicting statute, decides a case apparently in contravention of the
clear words of the statute. The case is appealed to the district court.
Finally, the Louisiana Supreme Court reverses and remands to the agency
with instruction to follow the statute. Had the agency ruled on the
constitutionality of the statute in the beginning, an appeal of right by
the adversely affected party would probably lie directly in the Louisiana
Supreme Court.89 There would have been a one-time adjudication of
the constitutionality of the statute with the concomitant result, regardless
of the outcome, that the parties are more expeditiously moved to a
final result. 90
C. Agency Expertise or Lack Thereof
Another argument against the agency's exercise of the power to
adjudicate constitutionality of statutes may lie in the idea that agencies
are due deference only in matters within the scope of their expertise.
86. Id., § 2.08, at 43.
87. Id.
88. See discussion supra note 24.
89. La. Const. art. V, § 5(D)(1).
90. After remand and some two years of litigation, the case was settled by compromise.
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Inherent in this concept is the idea that pure questions of general law,
and especially constitutional law are not within the agency's sphere.
Phrased succinctly, the agency has no expertise in these matters.9'
The courts are usually willing to give agencies great latitude in their
decision making powers in matters in which the agency has been delegated
power by the Constitution or the legislature.Y The usual language is
"great deference" or "absence of abuse of power by the agency" in
matters of findings of fact and in the agency's interpretations of its
own rules or regulations or laws relating to its area of expertise. Even
the standard of review, generally review upon the record and not de
novo, is a deference to the agency's decision making role.
As a matter of policy one must ask what risk is incurred if the
court recognizes the power of a constitutionally created agency to pass
on the constitutionality of statutes. The court is not required to give
such determination any weight. On the other hand, there is no reason
to think that the agency will not fully and properly perform this task
as well as it performs any of its constitutional duties. It seems likely
that the court will have an agency decision that will be solidly founded
in the law and as fully developed as that which a district court might
develop. In fact, given the docket problems in many district courts, the
agency decision may even be superior. It would appear that the greatest
risk that the interested party may encounter is the deliberative delays
that an agency decision may impose. Even this risk may be illusory if
a court that is asked to entertain a constitutional question prior to
agency action may dismiss the suit as premature.
However, even the risk of administrative delay may be minimized
by agency rules that allow prompt adjudication of non-technical issues
such as constitutional challenges. This has an added efficiency advantage
in that the agency and the parties may avoid the expense of the full-
blown agency factual finding that is usually necessary if the case cannot
be resolved on the constitutional issue. Otherwise, upon subsequent
remand following a court's determination on the constitutional issue
agency action may require expensive repetition of the previous factual
evidence, compounding the expense of a final agency adjudication.
1. Other Judicial Concerns
It is, however, possible that the agency expertise/separation of pow-
ers rubric is a manifestation of other judicial concerns. Arguably, by
giving a restrictive interpretation to the agency's powers through tra-
91. See discussion accompanying supra notes 80-83 for some suggestion of the level
of expertise of certain retained courts.
92. See supra note 16.
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ditional objections the court is mitigating the potential effects of political
influence on elected or appointed agency officers. Additionally, the court
may be reacting to the fact that is there is no clear "separation of
powers" within the agency. In fact, the executive, legislative, and judicial
functions may well all be exercised by the same persons in an agency.
If due process is the ultimate concern of the court; then the scope
of the power that may be implied in the constitutional powers granted
to the agency may be circumscribed by narrow construction. As long
as the Louisiana Consumers' League93 rule stands, the Administrative
Procedure Act's structured due process will be unavailable. Without the
benefit of the APA but faced with the presumption of administrative
regularity and, in some cases, conclusive presumption of finding of fact
by a non-article V, quasi-judicial court, the Louisiana Supreme Court
may be expected to continue its tendency "to err" on the conservative
side, probably without great elaboration of its rationale.
V. DECIsIoNs FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS9
A. California
California's constitutional posture is unique. In 1978 the voters
passed a constitutional amendment that specifically denies the power to
administrative agencies, specifically including those created by the con-
stitution or initiative, to declare a statute unconstitutional. 5 This was
an apparent reaction to decisions such as the 1976 case of Southern
Pacific Transportation Co., v. Public Utilities Commission" in which
the California Supreme Court stated that:
93. Louisiana Consumers' League, Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 351 So. 2d 128
(La. 1977). See supra discussion note 24.
94. The Model State Administrative Procedure Act § 5-112(1), 14 U.L.A. 152 (Supp.
1984), apparently wouldoallow review of challenges to facial constitutionality only, and
further narrows review to cases in which state law prohibits the agency from passing on
the validity of the statute. Gelpe, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Lessons from
Environmental Cases, 53 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1984).
95. Cal. Const. art. III, § 3.5:
Sec. 3.5.
An administrative agency, including an administrative agency created by the
Constitution or an initiative statute, has no power:
(a) To declare a statute unenforceable, or refuse to enforce a statute, on the
basis of it being unconstitutional unless an appellate court has made a deter-
mination that such statute is unconstitutional;
(b) To declare a statute unconstitutional;
(c) To declare a statute unenforceable, or to refuse to enforce a statute on
the basis that federal law or federal regulations prohibit the enforcement of
such statute unless an appellate court has made a determination that the en-
forcement of such statute is prohibited by federal law or federal regulations.
96. 134 Cal. Rptr. 189, 191, 556 P.2d 289, 291 (1976).
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The Legislature has limited the judiciary from interfering with
the commission by restricting review to the Supreme Court and
by additionally restricting review to determining "whether the
commission has regularly pursued its authority, including a de-
termination of whether the order or decision under review vi-
olates any right of the petitioner under the Constitution of the
United States or of this State." . . . Public Utilities Code section
1732 provides corporations and individuals may not raise matters
in any court not presented to the commission on petition for
rehearing, reflecting, when read with the judicial review sections,
legislative determination that all issues must be presented to the
commission. Under the broad powers granted it, the commission
may determine the validity of statutes.97
Cases after the 1978 amendment have had little problem applying
the amendment given its clarity. 9 In fact, the courts have even expanded
the section beyond its literal words. In deciding whether or not to extend
section 3.5 to include a city ordinance the court, in a style that would
give a warm glow of familiarity to any civilian, found that the language
and legislative intent of section 3.5 would support such an extension."
In another case, the plaintiffs objected to a requirement of admin-
istrative exhaustion. The plaintiffs observed that the remedies they are
required to seek in the agency are based upon an unconstitutional statute.
Thus, they contended that since article III, section 3.5 prohibits the
agency from declaring the statute unconstitutional, exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies would be futile.10° The court, finding that in fact
the lower court did not base its ruling on the doctrine of administrative
exhaustion, pretermitted this interesting question.
The amendment was raised in another case in an attempt to prevent
an administrative agency from deciding whether or not to apply an
97. Id. (emphasis added). 0
98. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 139 Cal. App.
3d 1037, 1041-42, 189 Cal. Rptr. 298, 301 (1983); Fenske v. Board of Admin. 103 Cal.
App. 3d 590, 595, 163 Cal. Rptr. 182, 185 (1980).
99. While an ordinance is not a statute in every sense, it is a legislative
enactment by the city's duly authorized legislative body. The purpose of
article 3, section 3.5, is to deny administrators the power to refuse to
enforce measures duly enacted by the authorized legislative body on the
basis of the administrator's own assessment of the measure's constitu-
tionality and in the absence of a final judicial determination of uncon-
stitutionality. That purpose suggests the rule's applicability a fortiori to
an "arbitrator" acting as an ad hoc administrative agency pursuant to
municipal legislation.
Westminster Mobile Home Park Owners' Assoc. v. City of Westminster, 213 Cal. Rptr.
640, 645 (Cal. App. 1985) (citations omitted).




amended statute retroactively based upon constitutional grounds. The
court, however, in Allen v. Board of Administration'0' affirmed an
administrative trial judge's ruling that the Board may determine whether
or not the application of an amended statute would be constitutional.' °2
It is interesting to observe how adeptly the California courts moved
from the incredible position taken in Southern Pacific to the mainstream
position of holding a tight rein on agency adjudication of statutory
constitutionality. What is more interesting to note is that separation of
powers entered the discussion in support of the former position and not
the latter. The Southern Pacific court expressly premised its position
upon the legislature's act of limiting the judiciary from interfering with
the commission by restricting review. However unlikely it may seem,
arguably, the Southern Pacific rationale could be made in Louisiana
based upon the specific language of section 21 of article 4 as it relates
to judicial review. The question then becomes whether our legislature
and electorate would also revolt.
B. North Dakota
In a more traditional approach to the problem, in First Bank Of
Buffalo v. Conrad,13 the North Dakota Tax Commission, a statutory
commission, was asked to declare the very law which it administered
unconstitutional and refused to do so. The reviewing court cited Buckeye
Industries, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor'°4 for the proposition that:
No administrative tribunal of the United States has the
authority to declare unconstitutional the act which it is called
upon to administer. 05
The court then noted that its examination of the North Dakota
Administrative Agencies Practice Act,1°6 disclosed that no authority has
been given, expressly or implicitly, to the administrative agencies to
declare any law unconstitutional. Thus, the decision of the tax court
rendered under the statute was affirmed.
C. Connecticut
Connecticut, when facing the question in a case involving a statutory
commission followed the majority rule, but with some opposition. Cal-
101. 187 Cal. Rptr. 192 (Cal. App. 1982).
102. Id. at 195.
103. 350 N.W.2d 580 (N.D. 1984).
104. Id. at 585, citing 587 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1979).
105. 350 N.W.2d at 585 (citations omitted).
106. N.D. Cent. Code §§ 28-32-01 through -19 (1983). See also supra note 94.
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dor, Inc. v. Thornton"°" follows the traditional separation of powers
analysis in a case that raised the question of the constitutionality of a
statute that allegedly violated the establishment clause of First Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution in a case before the Board of
Mediation and Arbitration.1°8
One justice, however, voiced a strong dissent to the board's failure
to adjudicate the constitutionality of the statute in question. °9
The majority appears to rely upon the separation of powers
doctrine as precluding the delegation of "Judicial power" outside
the court system. A decision by a nonjudicial authority upon
other legal questions, the propriety of which the majority opinion
does not challenge, is an exercise of judicial power of the same
kind as that involved in resolving a constitutional question. Not
only is the distinction made by the majority wholly unprece-
dented, but it is also thoroughly impractical in the adjudication
processes of arbitrators and public agencies where constitutional
issues frequently arise."0
VI. PUBLIC RIGHTS-PRIVATE RIGHTS: ANY CLuES HERE?
A. Worker's Compensation ALJ System
A recent attempt to establish an administrative law judge ("ALJ")
system for the adjudication of worker's compensation claims was held
to be an unconstitutional attempt by the legislature to divest the article
V district courts of their original jurisdiction by legislation rather than
constitutional amendment. This judicial rebuff in Moore v. Roemer"'
was followed by a successful constitutional amendment to article V,
sections 10(A) and 10(B) and 16(A) in 1990 to legitimate the ALJ
system." 2
Moore, however, is clearly distinguishable from the constitutional
agency question that is the subject of this paper in that the worker's
107. 191 Conn. 336, 464 A.2d 785 (1983).
108. The Board is composed of two panels of three members each. One member is
represents labor, another employees, and the last represents the public in general. Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 31-91 (1987). Powers of the Board include the power to "enter any estab-
lishment in which a strike or lockout exists in order to examine payrolls and other records
and to inspect conditions affecting relations." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-95 (1987). The Board
generally arbitrates or mediates in labor disputes. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 31-91 to -100
(1987).
109. Caldor, Inc., 191 Conn. at 351-53, 464 A.2d at 794-95 (Shea, J. dissenting).
110. Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
111. Moore v. Roemer, 567 So. 2d 75 (La. 1990).
112. 1990 La. Acts No. 1098, § 1.
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compensation system is and has always been a statutory, rather than a
constitutionally based system. As such it is easier for the court to make
the argument, without regard to the merits of the argument, that a
statutory change to create the ALJ system and concomitantly divesting
article V district courts of original jurisdiction in these matters cannot
amend the constitutional grant of jurisdiction enjoyed by the district
courts. But does the court's rationale give any useful clues to the present
question?
B. The Challenge-More Than Equal Dignity?
Undoubtedly, the court has "thrown down the gauntlet" to the
legislature by forcing a constitutional amendment before recognizing that
any of the district court's original jurisdiction has been divested. Was
the ALJ system devised for the worker's compensation system greatly
different in principle than the judicial powers of the PSC or the CSC?
Surely, the ALJ system will be subject to the APA, unlike the PSC
and CSC.
The lesson of Moore might be that the court is willing to surrender
or share jurisdiction only by virtue of an act of equal dignity with that
which granted the jurisdiction and no less. The Moore court relied
heavily on the distinction between public-rights and private rights. The
court noted that unlike the unemployment compensation system which
employs a permissible statutory ALJ system, the worker's compensation
system "is not a matter of public law."" 3
C. Defining Public-Rights
The state argued that "it is appropriate for the Legislature to relegate
worker's compensation and other matters of public law to adjudication
by procedures established by the legislature which are different from
the original jurisdiction in the district courts. ' '"" 4 The court refused to
endorse this quote from Marine Shale Processors as appropriate to the
workers' compensation ALJ system. It held instead that worker's com-
pensation is not a matter of public law.
The court noted that with respect to the worker's compensation
system that while (1) the Legislature does define relationships, rights
and duties from which the parties are not free to derogate, the ensuing
litigation (2) adjudicates a dispute between private parties to which the
government is not a party, and (3) results in a money judgment affecting
only those parties. ' 5 The court additionally noted that the government
113. Moore, 567 So. 2d at 81.
114. Id., citing Marine Shale Processors, Inc. v. State of Louisiana, Dept. of Envtl.
Quality, 551 So. 2d 643 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 553 So. 2d 465 (1989).
115. Moore. 567 So. 2d at 81.
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is not involved in the private insurance based compensation system unlike
the unemployment compensation system ' 6 where "the government op-
erates the system and pays the benefits, 1 7 allocating the costs thereof
by various criteria to all employers in the state.""18
D. Why Does It Matter?
The public-rights/private-rights distinction has grown out of a tur-
bulent history in the United States Supreme Court as the Court struggled
with the power of Congress to create non article-Ill courts and to give
the article-III courts appellate or concurrent jurisdiction in the matters
over which these other courts had jurisdiction.' '9 Can Moore can be
read as adopting in principle the public-rights analysis with its expansive
interpretation in Schor? 20 Is this a criteria by which the legislature may
rightfully divest the courts of jurisdiction? If so, then crucial questions
arise as to the nature of the constitutional agencies under this analysis.
The PSC and CSC each have adjudicatory functions that closely
resemble those that the Moore court ascribed to the unemployment
compensation system. They also have adjudicatory functions that closely
resemble the private rights model, e.g., Herman Brothers. On balance,
the PSC more closely fits the public-rights model because of its broad
regulatory powers the effect of which oftentimes is to create something
akin to a public monopoly.
However one might classify either of these agencies, there does seem
to be an inconsistency reflected between Moore and Herman Brothers.
The former suggests that the public-rights doctrine reflected in mere
legislative acts may be sufficient in some cases to alter significantly the
jurisdiction given to district courts by the state constitution. The latter
denigrates the PSC's meek assertion that its constitutionally based powers
116. La. R.S. 23:1621-1635 (1985).
117. This portion of the court's opinion misapprehends the nature of the unemployment
compensation statutes. That system is in fact funded by an employer contribution system,
collected by taxes and assessments. The collections are accounted for on an individual
basis for each employer in a separate account. La. R.S. 23:1491-1494 (1985). Services
rendered by the state under programs such as Aid to Families With Dependent Children,
La. R.S. 46:231 et seq. (1982), more closely resemble the public-rights model.
118. Moore, 567 So. 2d at 81.
119. National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., Inc., 337 U.S. 582, 69 S.
Ct. 1173 (1949). In a controversial plurality opinion, Mr. Justice Jackson opined that
article I gave Congress the power to authorize article III courts to adjudicate non-article
III claims. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 106 S. Ct. 3245
(1986). The court approved of an article I tribunal that would have exclusive jurisdiction
over certain traditional common-law claims. Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting, deplored the
incremental demise of the important functions of article III courts.
120. See supra note 119.
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may preempt the legislature (and probably the courts) in certain limited
matters.
Nonetheless, Brisset still seems to define the current limit on the
implied article-V impingement that the court is willing to allow by a
constitutionally based agency. It remains to be seen whether or not the
private/public-rights distinction will provide the constitutional agencies
an acceptable basis upon which the Louisiana Supreme Court is willing
to modify the separation of powers doctrine reflected in the 1974 con-
stitution.
VII. OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS
As noted earlier, the 1974 Constitutional provisions relative to the
PSC are remarkably unchanged from previous constitutions.1 2' There is
nothing in the provisions that would exclude the PSC's ability to refuse
to apply a statute on the grounds that it conflicts with the PSC's
constitutional grant of authority. However, the absence of a restriction
on the exercise of an unenumerated right is a poor substitute for con-
stitutional foundation for its exercise.
A. The Constitutional Oath of Office
One might argue that the constitutional oath,' 22 taken by every
official, would require that PSC members refuse to apply a statute that
they deem in good faith to be unconstitutional. In the 1959 case of
Smith v. Flournoy,123 the supreme court made it clear that taking the
oath did not allow the officer to question the constitutionality of the
laws with which he is entrusted to administer. In Smith a voter registrar
refused to obey a statute requiring certain ministerial functions claiming
that the statute unconstitutionally subjected her to criminal sanctions.
The court rejected the argument and required compliance.
In Damerson-Pierson Co. v. Bryant, 24 the court elaborated on the
role of the oath:
In the performance of their duties, public officers are governed
by the existing law, including statutes, constitutional provisions,
121. See supra note 3.
122. La. Const. art. X, § 30 provides that:
Every official shall take the following oath or affirmation:
I ... , do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the constitution and
laws of the United States and the constitution and laws of this state and that
I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent
upon me as . . ., according to the best of my ability and understanding, so
help me God.
123. Smith v. Flournoy, 238 La. 432, 115 So. 2d 809 (1959).
124. 245 La. 208, 157 So. 2d 886 (1963).
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and judicial construction placed thereon by the courts, and their
oath to obey the constitution does not "impose on them the duty
or obligation to determine whether a statute is constitutional
before they obey it. Accordingly, officers must obey a law found
on the statute books until, in a proper proceeding, the courts,
have passed on its constitutionality, but this rule has excep-
tions....
Laws are presumed to be constitutional until the contrary is
judicially established; the officers upon whom have been imposed
the duty of executing those laws are without authority to oppose
their execution, however clear it may appear to them that the
statutes contravene the Constitution. 125
However, the distinction that arises when considering the PSC and
the CSC is that each has certain positive, absolute constitutional powers.
Thus, one must question whether there exists a hierarchy in the PSC
and CSC officers' two-fold duty to uphold the constitution and statutes.
Does the positive constitutional power require the officer to uphold the
constitution over the statutes? It would seem that an expansive reading
of such powers does. This result clearly distinguishes those cases in
which an officer possesses only statutory powers. This analysis har-
monizes the proposed PSC/CSC power and the result in Smith and
Bryant. 1
26
At a minimum, the oath might be considered only to create a
standard for the acceptable performance of office sufficient to avoid a
challenge for malfeasance of office. 27 Such a narrow application of the
oath constitutional provision gives it independent meaning without the
consequences of the more expansive reading suggested in the previous
paragraph. Indeed, it is difficult to believe that any rational framer or
125. Citations omitted.
126. Id. at 222, 157 So. 2d at 891. Smith, no doubt, leaves agency officers in quandary.
The application of a statute seems to raise the specter of an action in damages against
the officer in his personal capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1989). If the officer stays
his action, seeks a declaratory judgment and the statute is declared unconstitutional, then
exposure is minimal. However, if the statute is upheld, then the refusal may result in
personal liability. If the officer applies the statute, seeks a declaratory judgment and the
statute is declared unconstitutional, then the state has probably effectively lost the cost
of performance, which in the case of large social programs may be substantial. Only if
the statute is upheld will his application of the statute result in no personal liability or
loss to the state.
127. State v. Perez, 464 So. 2d 737 (La. 1985). The supreme court stated that "this
oath imposed a specific duty upon [the defendants] not to obstruct or interfere with the
execution of those laws." Cited in W. Hargrave, supra note 16, at 182.
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ratifier would have every agency officer passing on constitutionality of
statutes. 128
The middle ground, that of the more direct application of the oath
provision, by a constitutionally created agency that has a developed
mechanism for record development and judicial review, may not be an
unreasonable interpretation of the oath article. The difficulty with this
suggestion is the lack of significant historical or textual support in the
constitution itself upon which the court could make this distinction.
B. The Constitutional Convention
The records of the 1973 Constitutional Convention are silent as to
any intent the framers may have had regarding the power of a consti-
tutionally created agency to declare statutes unconstitutional.1 29 This
result comports with the fact that the language concerning the powers
of the PSC is virtually unchanged from that of the 1921 Constitution.1 30
Additionally, there was no change in the PSC or CSC appeal route
between the two constitutions. However, this lack of framer's intent in
the agency creation articles is dispositive of nothing since the prohibition
of this agency power seems to arise from the judiciary's interpretation
of the separation of powers doctrine, rather than the agency creation
articles. I3 I
C. The Declaratory Judgment Act-Is It Enough?
One possible alternative to a constitutional battle is to allow the
parties to seek a declaratory judgment of the constitutionality of the
application of a particular statute on an ad hoc basis. 32 An action for
128. The 1974 Constitution includes many other agencies: art. 4, § 5(E)-Pardon
Board; art. VI, § 16-Local Public Agencies, § 17-Historic Preservation Commissions;
§ 19-Special Districts, Boards, and Agencies; § 38-Levee Districts; § 43-Port Corn-.
missions; art. VII, § 7-Interim Emergency Board; § 8-State Bond Commission; art.
VIII, § 3 (!974, amended 1979)-BESE Board; § 5-Board of Regents; § 6-Board of
Trustees for State Colleges and Universities; § 7-Boards of Supervisors for LSU &
Southern Universities; § 9-Parish School Boaids; art. IX, § 7-Wildlife and Fisheries
Commission; § 8-Forestry Commission.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
130. See supra text accompanying note 30.
131. The 1974 Constitution contained a "repealer" article in La. Const. art. XIV, §
18(B):
Laws which are in conflict with this constitution shall cease upon its effective
date.
What is not clear is whether agencies can avail themselves of implied repeal without
court sanction. Nonetheless, it would seem that an implied repeal which results by operation
of law is a distinctively different creature than an affirmative decision of unconstitutionality
by the agency.
132. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 1871-1876.
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a declaratory judgment is an ancillary proceeding which is time con-
suming and expensive. Also, declaratory judgments"' may be used by
a combative opponent of potential agency action as a dilatory tactic. 134
While Herman Brothers did not involve an action for declaratory judg-
ment, it demonstrates by analogy the inefficiency and associated cost
of adjudicating constitutional issues prior to reaching the merits of a
claim. In Herman Brothers the net result of the legal battle going to
the supreme court was that on June 28, 1990, over two years later, the
parties were back in the same position as they were when the application
for transfer was filed on January 5, 1988. This is not judicial efficiency.,
Aside from the problem of judicial inefficiency if the declaratory
judgment is used, several code provisions could impede one's ability to
obtain a declaratory judgment. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article
1871 restricts the use of the declaratory judgment action to "[clourts
of record within their respective jurisdictions. 1136 Article 1872 further
limits the action to rights, status, or other legal relations affected by a
statute. 3 7 While the court is not limited by the express scope described
in article 1872, article 1875 does express the general scope of the action.
It limits the action to "any proceeding where declaratory relief is sought,
in which a judgment or decree will terminate the controversy or remove
an uncertainty."' 38
133. See infra discussion at note 139.
134. La. Code Civ. P. art. 863(D) (1989) sanctions may curtail such practice, but the
extent to which the courts are willing to use this relatively new power is yet unclear.
Another interesting possibility for limiting such dilatory tactics may be the holding
reflected in Penalber v. Blount, 550 So. 2d 577 (La. 1989), in which the Louisiana Supreme
Court recognized that an attorney may be held personally accountable for his intentional
tortious conduct in the course of litigation that affects a third person. The Penalber
holding may ultimately be of less importance than one might initially guess. If the plaintiff
alleges an intentional tort on the part of the attorney, the attorney's insurer will raise
the intentional act exception common to most professional malpractice policies. It seems
unlikely that the wise plaintiff will give-up a claim against the attorney's insurance coverage
for negligent acts in order to avail himself of the intentional act Penalber action. However,
even this choice is complicated by the general rule that an attorney owes no duty to
avoid negligent conduct that may injure a third person.
Additionally, it is an open question whether a frivolous declaratory judgment action
or appeal of that action or a violation of an ethical rule (Title 37, chapter 4 appendix,
Articles of Incorporation of the Louisiana State Bar Association, Art. 16) will fall under
the Penalber rule. The Scope statement of the Preamble of the American Bar Association
Model Rule of Professional Conduct, upon which Louisiana's rules are modeled, states
that "[v]iolation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor should it create
any presumption that a legal duty has been breached."
135. See supra note 90 for the final disposition of Herman Bros. on remand to PSC.
136. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1871.
137. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1872.
138. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1875.
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A textual argument might be based in article 1871 that no court
has jurisdiction over the matters within the constitutional agencies' ex-
clusive powers. Thus, no declaratory judgment can be rendered since
the court is without jurisdiction. 3 9 An additional impediment is that
under article 1872 neither rules, regulations, nor orders fall in that class
of legislative or juridical acts contemplated by the Declaratory Judgment
Act. 14 Article 1875 relaxes these otherwise limiting articles by requiring
that the declaration need only resolve an "uncertainty." This construc-
tion is in harmony with the mandate of Code of Civil Procedure article
1881 that the Declaratory Judgment Act is remedial and is to be "liberally
construed."
Liberal construction aside, a court must still be able to find that
it has jurisdiction before liberal construction becomes an issue.
Jurisdiction raises the fundamental question of whether or not the
potential codal impediments would be allowed to stand in light of the
clear grant of judicial power in article V of the 1974 Constitution.'4 '
This is the same question raised by the statutory provision providing
that the factual findings of the agency are conclusive and non-review-
able. 42 The question then becomes whether these codal and statutory
limitations are impermissible impingements on the powers of the courts
or are they statutory implementations of the modified separation of
powers that arguably arise out of a reading in pari materia of the 1974
Constitution Articles III, IV, V, and X.
Additionally, one must ask whether or not the judicial revival of
the 1983 action as a remedy for constitutional torts, a remedy which
does not require a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies, may force the
agencies to refuse to apply unconstitutional statutes without adverting
to the Declaratory Judgment Act.
VIII. POTENTIAL LIABILITIES UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
A suit by any interested party seeking a declaratory judgment of
the constitutionality of a particular statute is an option to exercise in
the traditional "separation of powers" scheme. However, the plaintiff
will usually encounter the procedural impediment of the dilatory excep-
tion of prematurity 43 based upon the failure to exhaust administrative
139. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1: "Jurisdiction is the legal power and authority of a
court to hear and determine an action . . . and to grant relief to which [the parties] are
entitled."
La. Code Civ. P. art. 2002: "A final judgment shall be annulled if it is rendered: ...
(3) By a court which does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit."
140. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 1871-1878.
141. See supra note 57.
142. See supra text accompanying note 75.
143. La. Code Civ. P. art. 926(1).
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remedies. On the other hand, an appeal from the agency decision will
generally be an appeal based upon the record made in the agency. The
standard of review in the appellate court will usually be "abuse of
discretion." Either way, the claimant is fighting an uphill battle that at
best leads back to the agency for a second try. It is this road that
"goes uphill in both directions" that may convince claimants in certain
situations to avail themselves of the power of section 1983 after the
agency acts.
Section 1983 provides a primary federal remedy' 44 in damages and
equitable relief for the deprivation of any federally granted right 45 by
a person acting under the color of law.'"6 The remedy has been held
to apply against states, 47 and local political subdivisions of the state. 4 s
Because of the protection afforded states against an unconsented
suit by the United States Constitution in the eleventh amendment, 49
actions against the state under 1983 take the form of a suit against the
state officer in his official capacity for equitable relief5 ° and in his
personal capacity for money damages. 5 ' The question that will arise in
the case of the suit against the official in his personal capacity will be
whether or not he has an immunity to the suit.
The cases considering the constitutionality of the state officer's action
usually raise the issue of deprivation of property without procedural
due process. Where the deprivation occurs by way of a random and
144. "The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need
not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 81 S. Ct. 473 (1961).
145. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1990) provides that:
Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
As to the meaning of "under color of law," see Note on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in P.
Bator, D. Meltzer, P. Mishkin, and D. Shapiro, The Federal Courts and the Federal
System 1240 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter Federal Courts].
147. Monroe, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S. Ct. 473.
148. Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978).
149. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I, 10 S. Ct. 504 (1890). But see Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989) and Delmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397 (1989).
150. In seeking prospective injunctive relief against a state official exercising some
ostensible unconstitutional power, the eleventh amendment is not offended because the
equitable action is aimed at the person, not the state. This is the "fiction" of Ex Parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441 (1908).
151. By suing the state officer in his individual capacity for money diamages, conflict
is again avoided with the eleventh amendment while the compensatory purpose of § 1983
is served.
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unauthorized intentional conduct of the official, an adequate state law
remedy in tort may suffice for purposes of due process and obviate any
1983 liability.1 12 However, where the deprivation occurs by way of es-
tablished state procedure, e.g., an administrative procedure or hearing,
the post-deprivation hearing cannot satisfy the requirements of procedural
due process. 5 3 Violations of specific provisions of the Bill of Rights,
as incorporated into the fourteenth amendment, and violations of sub-
stantive due process, however, are subject to 1983 action regardless of
the procedural due process used to accomplish the deprivation. 154
Some persons possess absolute immunity for their actions."' The
"absolute" judicial immunity has been breached on those occasions that
the plaintiff could show that a judge was acting "in the clear absence
of jurisdiction,"'15 6 or that he was not performing a "judicial act."' 57
Others enjoy qualified immunities for their official actions.5 8 It is this
class of qualified immunity into which the administrative agency officer
will likely fall when his actions in choosing to enforce or not to enforce
a statute are called into question via a 1983 action.
Recognizing that the administrative agency may operate in a "quasi-
executive, legislative, or judicial mode," will the court then be willing
to extend the appropriate immunity to the officer's act? If the admin-
istrative agency issues a rule or regulation as a result of or in conjunction
with an enforcement proceedings, is this a judicial or executive function?
The question is more than academic to the officer involved if a 1983
suit arises and he wishes to rely upon an absolute immunity. Because
the qualified immunity is necessarily a mixed question of fact and law,
the officer cannot avoid the suit, as he might with absolute immunity.5 9
152. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S. Ct. 1908 (1981).
153. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984).
154. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986) (J. Stevens concurring).
155. Attorneys General-Gregoire, v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949); Judges-
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 335 (1871); Legislators-U.S. Const. Art. I, § 6;
President and his aides-Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
156. This is to be distinguished from acting in excess of jurisdiction. A criminal judge
that convicts a person of a "crime" which the legislature has not defined is acting in
excess of jurisdiction. A judge that tries a matter outside of the jurisdiction of his court
is acting in clear absence of all jurisdiction. In the former case the judge is absolutely
immune and in the latter he has no immunity. P. Ball, When the Defendant is the Judge,
12 Lawyer's Liability Rev. 1 (1989).
157. Federal Courts, supra note 146, at 1295.
158. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816-18, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2737-38 (1982)
(government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would know).
159. The following comments made regarding the necessity of absolute immunity for
judicial officers is equally applicable to legislative officers for analogous policy reasons.
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The rationale of the necessity of the absolute immunity arises out
of the fact that suits for damages are brought against the officer in his
individual capacity with the full intention that any judgment will be
paid by him personally. In Gregoire v. Biddle, 60 Judge Learned Hand
observed that
[I]t is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded
until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials,
the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and
to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor
of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the
unflinching discharge of their duties.
In the case of officers of Louisiana's constitutionally created agen-
cies, the members of the PSC are elected to six year terms1 61 and the
members of the CSC are appointed by the governor for six year terms.1 62
The PSC members are subject to removal by impeachment 63 and the
members of the CSC are subject to removal by the governor for cause.6
However, in neither case is there a supervisory structure over these
officers akin to the powers exercised by the Louisiana Supreme Court
under its supervisory powers and through the Judiciary Commission. 65
When compared by way of methods of election, removal, and su-
pervision in comparison with the state's judges, the PSC and CSC
officers that might desire to don the cloak of judicial absolute immunity
might have an uphill fight to convince a federal court judge that they
too need this absolute protection when acting in their judicial capacity 66
in order to preserve their independent decision-making process. 67
However one may react initially to the suggestion, perhaps there is
justification in fact for absolute immunity in the case of PSC or CSC
officers. The courts routinely give agency decisions the presumption of
160. 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
161. La. Const. art. IV, § 21.
162. La. Const. art. X, § 3. However, six of the seven nominations are provided by
a group of "politically independent" colleges and universities and the last slot is filled
by a person elected by the civil service employees themselves.
163. La. Const. art. X, § 24.
164. La. Const. art. X, § 5.
165. La. Const. art. V, § 25.
166. In Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 108 S. Ct. 538 (1988), the Supreme Court
reaffirmed that the determination of immunity is made by a functional approach. Immunity
attaches without regard to the identity of the actor. The test to determine whether or
not an act is "judicial," requires an analysis of: (1) whether the act is a function normally
performed by a judge, and (2) whether the actor deals with the parties in the judicial
capacity.
167. In Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1985), the court reflected that
it was better to have a few wrongs go unredressed than for the judiciary to be constantly
harassed by suits brought by disappointed litigants.
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regularity, generally agency's conclusions of fact are considered conclu-
sive and agency's interpretations of its own rules, regulations, orders,
and governing statutes are accorded great deference. In according finality
of findings of fact to the agency record, the courts are in fact giving
greater deference to the agency than is given to the lower courts under
Louisiana's system of appellate review of fact.'68 Arguably, since the
courts and the Constitution are treating the agency as a court, then the
appropriate immunity should be applicable. 69
In the likely instance that the agency officer is unable to present a
convincing case for the absolute immunity, then it would appear that
many of the actions that are possible in the regular business of the
agency may open the possibility that the officer will face the specter of
a 1983 suit. As discussed above, the United States Supreme Court has
held that procedural due process cannot overcome a violation of a federal
constitutional right or a violation of substantive due process. Thus, it
would appear the agency as primary and sometimes exclusive enforcer
of certain rights would arguably be both correct and justified in deciding
constitutionality of the applicability of statutes in the exercise of its
constitutionally mandated powers and duties in an effort to avoid 1983
liability.
CONCLUSION
Few high courts, with the exception of the dissent in Caldor, 70 have
seriously considered the possibility of an agency power to refuse to
apply a statute on the basis of it being in conflict with a constitutional
provision. Rather, the traditional rejection of such power is made with
perfunctory references to separation of powers, inherent power of courts,
or lack of expertise in constitutional matters.
In the one instance in which a supreme court found such power in
agencies, the initiative process led to a constitutional amendment to
prohibit such power in agencies.' 7' However, the California cases that
triggered this reaction seem to have recognized the power in all admin-
istrative agencies, constitutional or statutory, without limitation or qual-
ification. At the same time the cases recognized restricted review by the
168. See supra note 77.
169. This suggestion is not without problems. I am not suggesting that the agency
officers be classified as judges since that would invoke the immediate conflicts of article
V supervisory control by the Louisiana Supreme Court, as well as other constitutional,
and statutory conflicts. Perhaps I am suggesting that necessarily a new class of persons
be created which have an immunity which varies with the capacity in which they act. Be
that as it may, since the question is not within the scope of this paper, it will be left
along side of that vast wasteland of unanswered questions that adjoins any law school.
170. Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 464 A.2d 785 (1983).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 94-102.
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courts. The reaction was probably predictable. However, it does not
diminish the suggestion that such a power would be proper within the
scope of separation of powers for a constitutionally created agency that
has a developed mechanism for record development and complete judicial
review.
A textual argument exists that in the concurrent framing of article
II, section 2 and the article IV, section 21, and article X of the Louisiana
Constitution, the latter two articles mandating a quasi-judicial, quasi-
legislative, and quasi-executive agencies, the framers intended to modify
or surrender separation of powers in favor of the agencies to a limited
extent. The fiction of delegation of legislative powers as a justification
of agencies otherwise simply cannot support the treatment of the agency
decisions as decision of trial courts. 72
An appropriate answer to the fundamental question must begin with
an open appraisal of the constitutional power possessed by the PSC
and CSC. Then, if the conclusion remains that the constitutional agency
'has no power to refuse to apply a statute that it deems in good faith
to be in conflict with Agency's constitutional mandate, the court should
provide sound textual and policy bases for what would appear to be
an otherwise tenuous decision. Finally, the supreme court must consider
the nature of immunity that is proper for these agency officials if they
must enforce all statutes, 1983 risks aside.
Richard D. Moreno
172. See generally Johnson, supra note 16.
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